James Wilson was one of the original six justices appointed to the Supreme Court by George Washington. He was also one of the United States’ Founding Fathers, member of the Continental Congress, and a signer of the Declaration of Independence.  James Wilson was born on September 14, 1742 in Scotland and attended many Scottish universities without ever getting a degree. Wilson later moved to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1766 and began teaching at The Academy and College of Philadelphia. He soon began reading law at John Dickinson’s and attained the bar two years later.

James Wilson was nominated on September 24, 1789 for the role of an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court by George Washington, after the court began the 1789 Judiciary Act. Wilson was then was confirmed by the Senate on September 26, 1789, and received his commission three days later. Wilson only heard nine cases between his appointment in 1789 and his death nine years later.

As one of the first American legal philosophers, James Wilson thought through in great detail some of the thinking recommended in the decisions issuing around that time in the Supreme Court. Wilson felt particularly compelled to spend time arguing out the reasons and justification behind the decisions made in the court.

Hayburn’s Case (1792): A Supreme Court case where the court was invited to make a decision on whether Congress could assign certain non-judicial duties to the federal circuit courts which were in their official capacity. This case was the first time the Supreme Court looked at the issue of justifiability. Eventually, Congress reassigned the duties in question, and the Court did not have to give judgment in this case. At the time of the case, each of the Supreme Court Justices also served on a Circuit Court. Due to the fact, five of the six Justices including James Wilson declared it to be unconstitutional as judges in the District Courts.

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793): A Supreme Court case that was considered the first Supreme Court case of impact and significance. Because of the date, there is very little legal precedent available. The case was superseded almost immediately by the Eleventh Amendment. In South Carolina in 1792, Alexander Chisholm, who was the executor of the Robert Farquhar’s estate, tried to sue Georgia State in the Supreme Court regarding payments for goods that were owned by Farquhar from the American Revolutionary War. General Edmund Randolph, the U.S. Attorney, argued on behalf of the plaintiff. Meanwhile, Georgia refused to appear as the defendant, claiming that it could not be sued as a sovereign state without granting consent to the suit.

The Court, including Justice James Wilson, decided in a 4 to 1 vote in favor of the plaintiff. The justices argued that Article III, Section II, of the Constitution rescinded the sovereign immunity of the states and gave federal courts the power to hear disputes between States and private citizens. Because of the case, the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution was ratified in 1795. Doing so removed federal jurisdiction in situations where citizens of a specific state tried to sue another state. However, a citizen of one state still had the power to sue the Federal courts if the state consented to the suit or if Congress abrogated the immunity of the state under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Georgia v. Brailsford (1794): A Supreme Court case where the judge presiding over the Court instructed the jury that they had the right to judge not only the law, but also the facts. This case is often thought of as the precedent of jury nullification. The Chief Justice explained the opinion, which was supported by James Wilson, which explicitly acknowledged jury nullification by saying that juries were the best judges of facts while courts were the best judges of law, but it still allowed juries to look at both parts to make a decision.

Hylton v. United States (1796): A U.S. Supreme Court case where the Court stated that a tax placed on carriages did not violate Article I, Section 9’s rule for the apportioning of direct taxes. The decision stated that the carriage tax was actually an excise tax instead of a direct tax, which required apportionment by population among the states. The Supreme Court also noted that a tax placed on land was a type of direct tax contemplated by the U.S. Constitution.

The case was significant because it was the first case heard Supreme Court that challenged the constitutionality of an act performed by of Congress. By holding up the tax, the Court exercised its power of judicial review, although the court refrained from overturning the statute. Rather than issuing a single opinion, the Justices issued their own analysis, but all of them including that of James Wilson still held the same position.

Calder v. Bull (1798): A Supreme Court case where the Court examined whether the court had the authority to review legislative decisions made by the state. The legislature of Connecticut demanded a new trial in a court regarding the contents of a will, which overruled the previous court ruling. In a unanimous decision by the Supreme Court which included James Wilson, the Supreme Court held that the Connecticut legislature’s actions were not in violation of the ex post facto law found in Constitution under Article I Section 10. This holding is still valid today and states that the ex post facto provision found in the Constitution applies only to criminal cases and not civil cases.

New York v. Connecticut (1799): A case heard by the Supreme Court that involved the State of New York and the State of Connecticut which came out of a land dispute between two private parties. This case with the first where the Supreme Court exercised its power of original jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution in order to hear the controversy between the two states. The land dispute involved a strip of land on the western border of New York bordering Pennsylvania which Connecticut claimed jurisdiction over and in turn granted the land to two private parties.

After New York granted certain parcels within the region to other private parties, the successors in title filed an action. The Court denied a motion to remove the suit from the Circuit Court, and New York then filed a bill in equity against the State of Connecticut. However, since the bill in equity was filed when the General Assembly of Connecticut was out of session, the state did not participate in the case. However, the claimants’ attorneys argued that no reasonable notice was given for the injunction to be allowed and that New York did not have an interest in the proceedings that deserved a stay. Justice James Wilson and the majority opinion of the Supreme Court found the notice to be sufficient, but denied the injunction, since New York lacked standing.

Louis Brandeis was a former Justice on the United States Supreme Court between 1916 and 1939. Brandeis was born in Louisville, Kentucky and attended Louisville University of the Public Schools. He then entered Harvard Law School where he graduated with the highest G.P.A. in the history of the school.

Louis Brandeis was nominated to become a justice of the Supreme Court on January 29, 1916 by President Wilson. However, this nomination was denounced and bitterly contested by conservative Republicans. This controversy resulted in the Senate Judiciary Committee holding a public hearing on regarding the nomination for the first time in its history. The trial allowed witnesses to come forth before the committee and provide testimony either in support of or in opposition to the confirmation. Many of the objections made regarding the nomination was due to Brandeis’ “radicalism” and “reformer” stances.  On June 1, 1916, the United States Senate officially confirmed Louis Brandeis’ nomination by a 47 to 22 vote. 

Gilbert v. Minnesota (1920): A Supreme Court case that dealt with a state law which prohibited interference with the enlistment efforts of the military. The majority opinion stated that the state did have the power for make the national purpose its own purpose and that this power could extend to the state exerting its own police powers in order to prevent the citizens of the state from obstructing its accomplishment.

In his dissent, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that the statute in question affected the privileges, immunities, and rights of a United States Citizen and that the statute deprived the citizen of some of his liberty by invading the freedom and privacy of the home. This statement suggested that Justice Louis Brandeis wished to introduce the idea of privacy as being connected to the Constitution and that it could work with the First Amendment to reassure the freedom of speech within the walls of a citizen’s residence.

Whitney v. California (1927): A Supreme Court decision where the Court discussed whether using a private wiretapped telephone conversation obtained by federal agents without any judicial approval as evidence would violate the defendant’s rights given by both the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. The Court held in a 5-4 decision that neither the rights of the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment of the defendant were violated by doing so. This decision by the Court was later overturned by the 1967 case Katz v. United States.

Justice Louis Brandeis wrote a particularly famous dissent regarding the case.  He attacked the proposal that expanding the Fourth Amendment to encompass telephone conversation protection was inappropriate.  He argued that mail was a public service provided by the government and telephone service was a public service provided by an authority, implying that there was no real difference between a sealed letter and a private telephone conversation. Justice Louis Brandeis argued further that even without the question of the Constitution, the judgment still should be reversed. In Washington, wiretapping was considered a crime, thus the federal court should not allow a prosecution utilizes a crime to continue. Because the 18th Amendment did not allow Congress to authorize to violate a state’s criminal laws of a state and the unlawful acts were not ordered by a government official but instead were done by individual officers, the government was not legally guilty. 

Roger B. Taney was the fifth Chief Justice in the Supreme Court between 1836 till his death in 1864. He was born on March 17, 1777 and received a basic education from many private tutors. Roger B. Taney entered Dickinson College at the age of 15 and graduated in 1795 with honors. Afterwards, he read law and in 1799 was admitted to the bar. Afterwards, he quickly became known as one of the most promising young lawyers in Maryland.

Roger B. Taney was nominated for the position of Associate Justice in January 1835 by President Jackson. He was confirmed for the seat on March 15, 1836, and was given his commission on the same day.  As a judge, Roger B. Taney often favored the power of the individual states. In many cases regarding the Commerce Clause worked to create a more nuanced way of accommodating competing state and federal claims of regulatory power, while more often leaning toward the states. 

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): A Supreme Court Case also known as the Dred Scott Decision, where the ruling by the court said that individuals African descent that were brought into the United States and kept as slaves, or the slaves’ descendants, were not protected by the United States Constitution and would never be considered U.S. citizens.

Chief Justice Roger B. Taney wrote the extremely controversial opinion that resulted from the 7-2 vote of the court. This was the first case since Marbury v. Madison where the Supreme Court decided that an act of Congress was unconstitutional. The opinion first began by concluding that the Supreme Court lacked the proper jurisdiction in the issue because Dred Scott did not have standing to sue in this court. The court continued on with the highly criticized action of concluding that Congress did not have the proper authority to illegalize slavery in federal territories and that, since slaves were not considered citizens, they did not have the right to sue in court. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney went even further by ruling that like chattels or private property, slaves could not be taken from their rightful owners without due process.

While Justice Robert B. Taney wanted to settle the issue of slavery with Court’s decision, instead the decision had the opposite effect. The Supreme Court’s ruling decision was heavily debated across the country. While the Court’s ruling was never explicitly overruled, the Court later stated in the Slaughter-House Cases that certain sections of the decision had been already overruled in 1868 by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837): A Supreme Court case regarding the Warren Bridge and Charles River Bridge of Boston that settled a dispute over a clause in the Constitution that discussed the regarding obligation of a contract. The Charles River Bridge Company had been allowed a charter to build a bridge over the Charles River which would connect Boston and Cambridge. When Massachusetts allowed another company to construct the Warren Bridge which would be very close to the first one and would join the same locations, the proprietors the first bridge claimed that the state legislature had violated the contract since it had implied exclusive rights. The Court sided ultimately with second bridge company in a 5-2 decision.

Chief Justice Roger B. Taney wrote in his opinion that the case was strictly about how the contract was interpreted and that the contract in question must be interpreted in a narrow way, meaning that the Charles River Bridge Company did not actually have the exclusive right to build the bridge there. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney went further and pointed out that a contract should be closely interpreted, and if there was any uncertainty, it should be decided by the public. 

William Rehnquist was an American jurist, political figure, and lawyer who served as a Justice on the United States Supreme Court as well as the 16th Chief Justice. Justice William Rehnquist’s views often promoted federalism and conservatism that strongly preserved the Reservation of Powers to the States under the Tenth Amendment. He served as Chief Justice for almost 19 years.

William Rehnquist was born on October 1, 1924 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He graduated in 1942 from Shorewood High School in 1942 and went on to attend Kenyon College for one quarter, but then entered the United States Army Air Forces. Rehnquist served in World War II. After the end of the war, William Rehnquist attended Stanford University under the provisions of the G.I. Bill. and received both a B.A and a M.A. degree in political science in 1948. Two years later, Rehnquist attended Harvard University, where he earned a M.A. government. After, he attended Stanford Law School where he graduated and received his Law Degree.

Gonzales v. Raich (2005): A decision made by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that the United States Congress could criminalize the use and production of home-grown cannabis even in states which had laws that approved its use for medicinal purposes. Congress could do this with the power given to them from the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice William Rehnquist joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent, which explained that federalism promoted innovation in the country by allowing one state the freedom to try different social or economic experiments that would not risk the rest of the country. The dissent also explained that the federal ban was overreaching and despite personal opinions, the medical marijuana ballot initiated was voted in and the Compassionate Use Act had been passed in California, so the state should have the right to continue their social and economic experiment. 

Lawrence v. Texas (2003): A landmark Supreme Court case that struck down a sodomy law in Texas by a 6-3 ruling. In the previous case Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the court had upheld a Georgia statute and claimed that there was no protection of sexual privacy in the constitution. The new ruling held that the previous case looked at liberty interest too narrowly. Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, which was Chief Justice William Rehnquist. The dissent objected to the Supreme Court’s decision to look at Bowers v. Hardwick and discussed that there were many subsequent decisions based on Bowers that came out of lower courts which could now be open to doubts. The dissent also noted that the rationale used to overturn the previous could just as easily be applied to overturn other court decisions such as Roe v. Wade, which had been recently used to hold up Planned Parenthood v. Casey.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992): A Supreme Court Case that looked at the constitutionality of numerous Pennsylvania state regulations that involved abortion. The plurality opinion of the court upheld the constitutional right to have an abortion. However, the court also examined many restrictions of the right and upheld certain portions while invalidating others. Chief Justice William Rehnquist was a part of the plurality opinion which stated that their opinion was upholding the essential precedent of Roe V. Wade, meaning that the right to abortion was a fundamental part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, Chief Justice William Rehnquist along with Justice Scalia dissented from the plurality’s decision by upholding Roe v. Wade while striking down the spousal notification law.

David Souter was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court who served from1990 to 2009, when he retired. David Souter was appointed by to fill the seat of Justice Brennan by President George H. W. Bush. At the time, David Souter was the only Justice on the Supreme Court with an extensive amount of previous court experience outside of the federal appeals court. He had previously served as a prosecutor, an attorney general, and a judge on both state appellate and trial courts.

David Souter was born on September 17, 1939 in Melrose, Massachusetts and attended Concord High School in New Hampshire. He went on to attend Harvard College, where he graduated with an A.B. magna cum laude. After earning a M.A. from Magdalen College in 1963, Souter attended Harvard Law School, where he received his law degree in 1966.

As a Justice, David Souter was expected to be a judge who showed conservatism in his jurisprudence. For the first three years as a Supreme Court Justice, David Souter tended was conservative, although not as strongly as Justice Scalia, Thomas, or Rehnquist. His more dramatic turning point came in Planned Parenthood v. Casey where he reaffirmed the vital holding in Roe v. Wade.

Bush v. Gore (2000): A landmark Supreme Court decision on December 12, 2000, that resolved the controversy of the 2000 presidential election in favor of George W. Bush. Eight days before, the U.S> Supreme Court had decided unanimously the related case of Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (2000) and three days before that, had preliminarily stopped the recount that was happening in Florida. The Court ruled in a per curiam decision that the Florida Supreme Court’s technique for the ballot recount violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court also ruled that no other method could be made within the time limits that were created by Florida State.

While Justice David Souter agreed that there was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in using different methods of counting in different counties in Florida, he also dissented due to many different issues in the case. Justice David Souter specifically dissented against the opinion that the Supreme Court of Florida had acted oppositely to the legislature’s intent. Justice Souter further dissented the majority opinion regarding stopping the ballot recount. He acknowledged that the counting done prior and on December 9 were not aligned with the Equal Protection requirements. However, he still wanted to send the case back to the Supreme Court of Florida in order to allow the court to create uniform standards of legal voting and then recount the ballots based on those standards.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992): A Supreme Court Case that challenged the constitutionality of many Pennsylvania state regulations dealing with abortion. The plurality opinion of the court upheld the constitutional right to have an abortion. However, the court also examined many restrictions of the right and upheld certain portions while invalidating others.

Justice David Souter defied expectations and joined the plurality opinion which wrote that their opinion was upholding the vital precedent of Roe V. Wade, which meant that the right to abortion was a fundamental part of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 

It went on further to describe the importance of standing by previous court decisions even if the precedent seemed unpopular, unless a drastic change in the fundamental reasoning of the previous decision had occurred. The plurality with Justice David Souter continued and described the rejection of the separate but equal idea notion as the actual reason for the court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education court’s where they rejected the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine.

John Marshall was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court between 1801 and 1835. His court opinions helped create the foundation for constitutional law in America and made the United States Supreme Court a coequal branch of government with the executive and legislative branches. Previously, John Marshall had acted as the leader of the Virginia Federalist Party and also served in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1799 and 1800. Marshall was also the Secretary of State Adams from 1800 to 1801 under President John.

As the longest-serving Chief Justice in the history of the Supreme Court, John Marshall dominated the Supreme Court for over 30 years and played an important role in the evolution of the American legal system. His most noted contribution was reinforcing the idea that the federal courts were obligated to exercise judicial review, by discounting supposed laws if they violated the Constitution. Under Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court made many important decisions regarding to federalism, which affected the balance of power between the states and the federal government. Particularly, John Marshall confirmed the authority of federal law over state law multiple times, and he supported an expansive interpretation of the enumerated powers.

John Marshall served as the Chief Justice during six different administrations, where he participated in more than 1000 decisions, writing more than half of the opinions himself. Marshall helped to establish the Supreme Court as the highest authority on interpreting the Constitution in controversies and cases that had to be decided on by the federal courts. Soon after becoming the Chief Justice, John Marshall changed the way the Supreme Court announced decisions. Previously, each Justice would write a seriatim or separate opinion. Under John Marshall, the Supreme Court implemented the practice of handing a single opinion of the Supreme Court, allowing the opinion to present a clear rule. Since John Marshall was nearly always the author of these opinions, he effectively became the sole spokesman of the Court in important cases.

Marbury v. Madison (1803): A landmark case by the Supreme Court and in United States law, as well as for worldwide law. The case created the basis for the power of judicial review by the judicial branch in the United States under the Constitution, specifically under Article III. This case also demonstrated the first time in Western history where a court nullified a law by pronouncing it unconstitutional, a process which is now called judicial review. The decision helped create and define the checks and balances found in American Government.

The case came out from a petition by William Marbury to the Supreme, who had been appointed as the Justice of Peace in the District of Columbia by President John Adams. However, the commission was not subsequently delivered to Marbury. Marbury then proceeded by asked the Supreme Court to force James Madison, the Secretary of State to deliver the documents. However, Justice Samuel Chase along with the Court and Chief Justice John Marshall denied the petition. Instead, the Court held that specific provision found in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which allowed William Marbury to bring forth his claim regarding the petition to the Supreme Court unconstitutional, because the act tried to extend the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond the point which was established by Article III of the constitution.

The decision was a unanimous one that was based on three distinct questions: whether Marbury had the right to a commission, if the country’s laws could give a legal remedy to Marbury, and whether getting the Supreme Court to give a writ of mandamus was the correct legal remedy for this situation. John Marshall easily answered the first two affirmatively and found that the failure of the commission delivery violated a vested legal right. When John Marshall though about whether Marbury had a remedy, he stated the government could not let a vested legal right be violated and thus a legal remedy should exist for it. 

When Chief Justice John Marshall looked at the third question, he first asked if a writ of mandamus was the correct legal remedy and if so, whether the Supreme Court could issue it. Marshall looked at the Judiciary Act of 1789 and decided that the Act’s purpose gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over the writs. He then looked to the Constitution, specifically Article III, which explains the original and appellate jurisdictions of the Supreme Court. Justice Marshall held that Congress did not have the authority to modify the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Consequently, Chief Justice John Marshall found that the Judiciary Act and the Constitution conflicted. This raised the critical question of what to do when the Constitution conflicted with an act passed by Congress. Chief Justice Marshall answered that any conflicting acts were not law and the Courts are instead bound to follow the Constitution first, which affirmed the idea of judicial review. 

Fletcher v. Peck (1810): A landmark Supreme Court unanimous decision where for the first time Court ruled a state law unconstitutional. This action helped start and create a precedent for the sanctity and importance of legal contracts, and implied that Native Americans did not actually hold title to their own lands. The case resulted in the Supreme Court, as well as Justice William Johnson, reaching a unanimous decision that ruled that the repeal by the state legislature of the law was not valid because of the unconstitutionality of the law.

The case revolved around a land grant that was approved by the Georgia legislature, called the Yazoo Land Act of 1795. Later it was revealed that the grant had actually been approved through bribery, and therefore the majority voters rejected many of the incumbents. The next Georgia legislature repealed the legislation and voided all succeeding transactions, including honest ones, resulting from the scandal. The opinion of the court, which was written by Chief Justice John Marshall, stated that a sale was a binding contract and could not be invalidated even if the contract was illegally secured, in accordance to the Contract Clause, or Article I, Section 10, Clause I of the Constitution.  Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the repeal would also seize property from those who had acquired it honestly, and would not provide compensation.

Based on the principle of the separation of powers, Chief Justice John Marshall questioned whether the rescinding act could even be considered valid if even in the case that Georgia were a fully sovereign state independent of the national Constitution. Ultimately, Marshall’s opinion relied on the restrictions placed by the federal Constitution. This case resulted in the Court asserting its judicial right to invalidate a state law which was in conflict with the Constitution.  

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819): A landmark Supreme Court decision which established two principles. The first of the two was that the Constitution gave Congress the implied powers to implement their will in order to make a functional national government. The second was that these powers and actions could not impede on any constitutional exercises of power performed by the federal government. This case resulted from an event where the state of Maryland tried to impede the operation of the Second Bank of the U.S. by placing a tax on all bank notes not chartered within the state.

While the law was generally applicable to all banks which were not chartered in Maryland, this particular bank was the only one existing in the state that was an out-of-state bank, meaning that the law specifically targeted this U.S. Bank. The Supreme Court determined that Congress did had the power to create the Bank. Chief Justice Marshall also refuted the argument that the states retain ultimate sovereignty since they ratified the constitution. He contended that it was the people who ratified the Constitution not the states, which made the people sovereign.

Chief Justice Marshall discussed the scope of congressional powers given under Article I. He addressed the necessary and proper clause and admitted that the Constitution did not enumerate a power to make a central Bank, but this did not mean Congress had the power to do so. Lastly, the opinion textually invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause, allowing Congress to try to meet an objective as long as it is within its enumerated powers and is not forbidden by the Constitution while it is rationally related to the objective at hand. With this interpretation, the court rejected Maryland’s extremely narrow interpretation of the clause, which assumed that “necessary” only meant that Congress could pass laws that were absolutely essential in executing its enumerated powers. Chief Justice Marshall ultimately determined that Maryland’s tax on the bank was unconstitutional. 

Cohens v. Virginia (1821): A Supreme Court decision which is most noted for Chief Justice John Marshall and the Supreme Court’s assertion of its power to look over state supreme court decisions regarding criminal law when plaintiff claims that their Constitutional rights were been violated. The Supreme Court had previously this jurisdiction over civil cases with American parties.

This case revolved around an act of Congress which approved the creating and operation of a District of Columbia lottery. The Cohen brothers started to sell these lottery tickets in the Commonwealth of Virginia, which violated state law. State authorities convicted the Cohen brothers, and the state courts said that the Virginia law which prohibited lotteries could be enforced, despite the act of Congress which allowed the D.C. lottery. The Cohen appeals appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that their actions were protected by the act passed by Congress.

The main issue in the suit was whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal of a criminal case which was decided by a state court. Virginia argued that the Constitution did not give the Supreme Court any appellate jurisdiction over criminal judgments made by the state courts. The state also argued that the Supreme Court did not have appellate jurisdiction according to the Constitution in cases which a state was a party. Effectively, Virginia believed that its decision was final and could not be reviewed by the federal courts, 

Chief Justice John Marshall and the Supreme Court used Article III, Section 2 to determine that the Supreme Court did have appellate jurisdiction regarding any case and that there were no exceptions to this jurisdiction for state being a party. This conclusion was also reinforced by the Supremacy Clause found in Article VI of the Constitution, which placed federal law above state law. Knowing this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court upheld the Cohen brother’s convictions. The Supreme Court found that Congress did not mean to authorize lottery ticket sale outside of the D.C., so no conflict existed between Congress authorizing a lottery and Virginia prohibiting lotteries within the state.

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824): A landmark Supreme Court decision the court held that Congress had the power to regulate interstate commerce by the Commerce Clause found in the Constitution.  The decision overturned a monopoly that was granted by the state legislature of New York to certain steamship companies operating between New Jersey and New York. Gibbons argued that since the Constitution gave Congress the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, states did not have the concurrent power to do the same.

Chief Justice Marshall avoided discussing the issue about the exclusiveness of the federal commerce power because it was not necessary to look at in order to decide the case. Instead, John Marshall focused on the actual, existing federal statute that existed for licensing ships, and he stated that the federal law in place was a legitimate exercise of the Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, meaning that the federal law in place superseded the state law that granted the monopoly.

The court ruled in favor of Gibbons. Because the commerce clause was the most argued point of the case, the Supreme Court had to answer whether the Commerce clause exactly what was being regulated. The Supreme Court held that commerce was more than just traffic, but that it was the trade of commodities and it included navigation. The Supreme Court interpreted commerce “among” the states as that which intermingled with.  Chief Justice John Marshall’s ruling determined that Congress had the power to regulate navigation as a part of Congress and that this Congressional power could extend to all aspects of the regulation, which would override any state laws that were contrary to it. The immediate result of this decision was to use Congress’ power to end many monopolies that were granted by state laws. Doing so lowered prices, raised competition, and promoted free enterprise.

Thurgood Marshall was the 96th Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States who served from October 1967 until October 1991. Justice Thurgood Marshall also the first African-American justice on the United States Supreme Court.

Before becoming a justice, Thurgood Marshall was a lawyer who was most noted for his high success rate when arguing cases before the Supreme Court. He was more particularly known for his victory in Brown v. Board of Education. Thurgood Marshall argued more court cases before the Supreme Court than anyone other individual in the history of the Supreme Court. Marshall also served on the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals after being appointed by President Kennedy and then later was appointed by President Johnson in 1965 as the Solicitor General. President Johnson also nominated Marshal in 1967 to the United States Supreme Court.

Thurgood Marshall was born on July 2, 1908 in Baltimore, Maryland grandson and the great-grandson of slaves.  Marshall attended Frederick Douglass High School in Baltimore where he graduated in 1925. He then went on to attend Lincoln University in 1930. There, Thurgood Marshall was initiated as a member of Alpha Phi Alpha, the first black fraternity.

While Thurgood Marshall wanted to apply to the University of Maryland School of Law, his hometown law school, the dean of the school said the school’s segregation policy would prevent his acceptance. Instead, Marshall attended Howard University School of Law and graduated in 1933 as the first in his class. 

As a Justice of the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall believed in the Constitution being a living document. Marshall argued that the Constitution should be interpreted with respect to the political, cultural, and moral climate of the age of interpretation.  This idea was also looked at as loose constructionism, meaning that the Constitution had a dynamic meaning or that the properties of the constitution were forever changing. The main idea that Marshall tried to convey was that the contemporaneous society should be considered when interpreting key constitutional phrases. 

Terry v. Ohio (1968): A decision by the Supreme Court which stated that if a police officer stops an individual or suspect on the street and frisks the person without any probable cause to arrest, the prohibition in the Fourth Amendment on unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated, as long as the police officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, will immediately commit a crime. The police officer must also have a reasonable belief that the suspect may be possibly armed and dangerous. 

The foundation of the Supreme Court decision was based on the understanding that the exclusionary rule has limitations, meaning that the point of the rule is to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures that are aimed at gathering evidence, rather than searches and seizures for other reasons, such as preventing crime or personally protecting police officers. 

Chief Thurgood Marshall joined Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court. The majority opinion first began by reciting the principles of the Fourth Amendment and whether they included situations such as the stop and frisk involved in the case. Two important points that the court particularly made were regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained through this police action, and whether the stop and frisk procedure was the result of officers over-exerting their authority.

The court, including Chief Thurgood Marshall also had to determine just when specifically a person would be considered “seized” and what would constitute as a “search”. The Supreme Court rejected the notion that a stop and search could not be considered a search or seizure subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection, but instead allowed more police action outside of a traditional arrest to be considered a seizure. The court also had to examine just what “reasonable” would include when taking reasonable action. With these principles though out, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Court feel that the stop and Frisk of Terry was in fact reasonable and that the evidence found during the search could be properly admitted because of this.

Miller v. California (1973): A landmark United States Supreme Court case which looked at what specifically constituted as unprotected obscenity for the sake of the First Amendment. The decision restated that obscenity was not protected under the First Amendment. It also established the Miller test, which could determine what constituted as obscene material. The appellant was Marvin Miller, an operator of a large mail-order business for sexually explicit material. He had conducted a mass mailing campaign advertising the sale of illustrated books that were labeled as adult material. The Superior Court of Orange County found him guilty of a misdemeanor for distributing obscene material knowingly. This conviction was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals of California.

When the case came up to the Supreme Court, the issue was whether the distribution and sale of obscene material was a protected action under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court ruled that distributing and selling was not protected. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged the potential dangers of attempting to regulate any form of expression and explained that State statutes that were designed to control the sale and distribution of obscene materials should be carefully limited.

United States v. Nixon (1974): was a United States Supreme Court unanimous decision which involved President Richard Nixon and the late stages of the Watergate scandal. This Supreme Court Case is often thought of as an extremely significant precedent which limits the power of a United States president.

The Watergate scandal started during the presidential campaign in 1972 between President Richard Nixon and Democratic Senator of South Dakota George McGovern. On June 17, before President Nixon won the presidential election, five burglars broke into the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate building complex in Washington, D.C.

President Nixon appointed Archibald Cox as the special prosecutor, charged with carefully investigating the break-in, but then Nixon arranged to have Archibald Cox fired in the Saturday Night Massacre. However, public outrage forced President Nixon to appoint a different special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, who was to conduct the Watergate investigation for the United States government.

In April 1974, Jaworski received a subpoena which ordered Nixon to release certain papers and tapes related to meetings between Nixon and those indicted by the grand jury, which contained damaging evidence involving those men and possibly the President. Nixon handed over edited transcripts and hoped it would be enough, but Judge John Sircica, the judge of the D.C. District Court, ordered the president to turn the tapes over. James St. Clair, Nixon’s attorney, and Jaworski appealed to the Supreme Court. St. Clair argued the issue should not be subject to “judicial resolution” since it was a dispute within the executive branch and that Nixon had an executive privilege to withhold and protect communications between Government officials and those advising them.

All of the Justices, including Thurgood Marshall, contributed to the opinion which was unanimous decision. The opinion stated that the Supreme Court did have the authority to resolve the issue and that and that Jaworski had proven that there was a significant chance that the tapes contained conversations relevant information to the offenses of the indictment. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that there was an unqualified, absolute Presidential privilege of immunity under all circumstances from the judicial process.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978): A landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court which ruled that the admission process of the University of California at Davis Medical School, which put aside 16 of the 100 available seats for African American students was unconstitutional. The justification of “diversity in the classroom” for looking at race as a factor in the school’s admissions policies was not the same in comparison to the original purpose stated by the school, whose admissions program that was under review was designed to ensure the admissions of minorities that were traditionally discriminated-against. UC Davis Medical School developed the program originally to decrease the historic deficit of conventionally disfavored minorities in the medical profession and in medical schools, fight against the effects of societal discrimination, increase the amount of physicians who would practice in communities that were currently underserved, and receive the educational benefits that result from a student body that is ethnically diverse.

Justice Thurgood Marshall joined Justice Powell’s opinion that the school had to admit Bakke to the school. However, his reasoning for this did not include the majority of justices. Justice Thurgood did join this opinion, which stated that the school had a reasonable and compelling interest in a creating a diverse student body and therefore could look at race as a factor in admissions. However the school could not specifically aside seats for certain races, which would automatically exclude others due to race. 

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986): A Supreme Court decision that supported the constitutionality of sodomy law from Georgia which both private anal and oral between consenting homosexual adults. Seventeen years after the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court overruled the decision directly in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and stated that these laws were unconstitutional. Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined a dissent by Justices Blackmun which said that the case was no longer just about the fundamental right for a citizen to engage in homosexual sodomy, but went further by looking at the rights most valued by citizens, specifically the right to be left alone. Justice Thurgood Marshall also joined a dissent made by Justice Stevens which went even further away from the majority opinion and said that the Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of the complaint made by the respondent even though the statute in question prohibits all sodomy. This prohibition was extremely unconstitutional for heterosexuals and it was clear through the States actions that the respondent alleged a constitutional claim which was sufficient enough to stand up to a motion to dismiss.

Texas v. Johnson (1989): A landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court which invalidated prohibitions regarding desecrating the American flag which was enforced in 48 of the 50 states. 

This case revolved around Gregory Lee Johnson, a former member of the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade, who participated in a political demonstration in Dallas, Texas during the Republican National Convention of 1984, which protested some policies of the Reagan Administration as well as some companies in Dallas. A demonstrator gave Johnson an American flag which was stolen from a targeted building. Once the protesters arrived at Dallas City Hall, Johnson drenched the flag with kerosene and set it on fire. While no one was injured, some claimed to be extremely offended. 

Johnson was charged with breaking the Texas law that prohibited the desecration of a venerated item. He was convicted, fined, and sentenced to a year in prison. The Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas saw the case through an appeal and overturned the conviction, saying that the State did not have the power to could not punish him for burning the flag since it was protected under the First Amendment as symbolic speech. However, the State of Texas claimed that its interests were more important than the symbolic speech rights because the state wished to preserve the national flag as a symbol of national unity while maintaining order, but the court stated that neither of these could justify the conviction.

The State asked the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case. The opinion of the court was a controversial 5-4 decision, with Justice Thurgood Marshall being a part of the majority. The court first looked at whether the First Amendment could include non-speech acts and, if so, if flag burning was included. The court found that in this case, the flag burning constituted as expressive conduct, allowing Johnson the protecting under the First Amendment. The court also found that there was no disturbance of the peace due to the flag burning, and rejected the States claim that the flag burning was to incite breaches of the peace. The last issue was if the states had a legitimate interest in preserving the national flag as a symbol of principles and national identity. However, the majority found that the lack of evidence for Constitutional support regarding flag burning, so the Court concluded that it was protected under the first amendment. 

Earl Warren was the fourteenth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He was born on March 19, 1891 in Los Angeles, California. Earl Warren grew up in Bakersfield, California and attended Kern County High School. He went on to attend University of California, Berkeley where he graduated in 1912 with a B.A. in Legal Studies, and then Boalt Hall Law School, where he received his LL.B. in 1914.

Eisenhower picked Warren in September 1953 to take the office the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As the chief Justice, Earl Warren was a very liberal justice, more than anyone had anticipated. Earl Warren was able to set up a long series of landmark decisions due to building a winning coalition. Warren’s term of office was included numerous rulings on civil rights, police arrest procedure, and separation of church and state in the United States.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954): A landmark Supreme Court decision that declared that state laws which separate public schools for white and black students as unconstitutional laws, which overturned the precedent set by Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). Justice Hugo Black was a part of the unanimous decision which stated that the separate educational facilities were inherently unequal.

The case called for the school district of Topeka to reverse its racial segregation policy for the schools. The Topeka Board of Education operated separate elementary schools under a Kansas law from 1879, which allowed but did not require the districts to have separate elementary schools for white and black students in twelve different communities with populations exceeding 15,000. The plaintiffs in the case felt that a system of racial separation, while pretended to provide separate but equal treatment of black and white Americans, perpetuated inferior services, treatment, and accommodations for black Americans. 

The Supreme Court heard the case in spring 1953, but they could not decide on the issue, so they reheard the case in fall 1953. During the second rehearing, the court paid close attention to whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the operation of different public schools for black and white students. The case was reargued at the request of Justice Felix Frankfurter, as a stalling tactic to gather a unanimous consensus in this case which would outlaw segregation. The justices who supported desegregation spent much effort trying to those the initial dissenters to join a unanimous, in order to prevent providing a legitimate counterargument for outlawing segregation.

Chief Justice Earl Warren set up a meeting with all the justices, and argued that the only reason to allow segregation was having an honest belief in the inferiority of African Americans.  Chief Justice Earl Warren further stated that the Court needed to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson in order to maintain the court’s legitimacy as an institution of liberty, and it unanimous to avoid Southern resistance. 

The holding of the Supreme Court was that, even if segregated white and white schools had equal teachers and facilities, segregation itself was unconstitutional and harmful to black students. There was a significant social and psychological disadvantage in black children due to segregation itself. This issue moved the case away from the question of whether the schools were equal, and instead looked at whether the idea of “separate but equal” was constitutional. The case resulted in de jure racial segregation being a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and also paved the way for the civil rights movement and integration.

Baker v. Carr (1962): A landmark Supreme Court case that moved away from the political question doctrine of the Court, and decided that that redistricting issues were justiciable questions, meaning that federal courts could intervene in order to decide reapportionment cases. After Chief Justice Earl Warrant left the Supreme Court, he stated that the Baker v. Carr line of cases were the most important cases in his tenure as the Chief Justice.

Charles Baker, the plaintiff, was a Republican residing in Shelby County, Tennessee, which was the county where Memphis was located. According to the Tennessee State Constitution, legislative districts had to be redrawn according to the federal census every ten years to create districts with substantially equal population. Baker’s issue was that Tennessee had redistricted since the 1901 census.

By the 1960’s, the population had shifted dramatically so Shelby County had nearly ten times as many citizens as some of the more rural districts. This meant that representationally, the votes of the citizens from the more rural districts had more value than the votes of the urban citizens. The argument made by Baker was that this issue was not letting him receive the equal protection of the laws which were required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Joe Carr, the defendant, was sued as Tennessee’s Secretary of State. While he had not set the district, he was sued ex officio since he was the official responsible for elections conduct of the state as well as and the district map publication. Tennessee argued that legislative districts were not judicial questions, but instead political questions, and should not be determined by the court. The defendants of the case argued unsuccessfully that legislative district reapportionment should not have been resolved by federal courts since it was a “political question”. The decision was split in a 6 to 2 and resulted in a reformulation in just exactly what questions could be considered “political”. 

The decision in this case was one of the most stressful in the Court’s history. No clear majority emerged and one of the justices was so torn that eventually he recused himself. Chief Justice Earl Warrant and the Court finally handed down an opinion on March 1962, almost a year after the case was initially argued. The Supreme Court split 6 to 2, with Chief Justice Earl Warren siding on the majority, and ruled that the case was justifiable.

John Paul Stevens was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court between December 19, 1975 and his retirement in June 29, 2010. Upon his retirement, John Paul Stevens was the oldest member of the Supreme Court and the third-longest serving associate justice in the history of the Court. John Paul Stevens was nominated by President Gerald Ford in 1975. After being confirmed by the Senate Stevens and he took his seat in the Supreme Court December 19, 1975, after being confirmed 98–0 by the Senate.

As a Supreme Court Justice, John Paul Stevens was considered to be a liberal justice in the Court. When he first began his tenure on the Supreme Court, John Paul Stevens had held relatively moderate positions in his opinions. But when he was in the conservative Rehnquist Court, Justice John Paul Stevens joined the liberal Justices on many issues such as federalism, gay rights, and abortion rights. 

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978): A landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court which ruled that the admission process of the University of California at Davis Medical School, which put aside 16 of the 100 available seats for African American students was unconstitutional. The justification of “diversity in the classroom” for looking at race as a factor in the school’s admissions policies was not the same in comparison to the original purpose stated by the school, whose admissions program that was under review was designed to ensure the admissions of minorities that were traditionally discriminated-against. UC Davis Medical School developed the program originally to decrease the historic deficit of conventionally disfavored minorities in the medical profession and in medical schools, fight against the effects of societal discrimination, increase the amount of physicians who would practice in communities that were currently underserved, and receive the educational benefits that result from a student body that is ethnically diverse.

Justice Paul Stevens wrote a plurality opinion which did not concur with the majority’s assertion that race could be a factor among many different ones when looking at admissions, but it did agree with the opinion that stated that the special admissions program excluded Bakke due to his race, which was unconstitutional.  Justice Paul Stevens’ plurality also agreed with the point in Powell’s opinion that said that UC Davis was required to admit Bakke into the class.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003): A Supreme Court case where the court upheld the affirmative action admissions policy set by the University of Michigan Law School in a 5-4 decision.  When the University of Michigan Law School denied admission to Grutter, a Michigan resident who had a 3.8 GPA and a LSAT score of 161 LSAT, Grutter alleged that the school had discriminated against her race, which was in violation of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), the Fourteenth Amendment, along with 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Grutter claimed that was rejected from the school due to the school’s use of race as a predominant factor which gave certain minority groups a significantly higher chance of admission and that the respondents did not have a compelling interest to justify using race.

The District Court found the use of race in the school’s admission process to be unlawful, but the Sixth Circuit reversed that decision. The Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit’s reversal, and upheld the University’s admissions policy.

Justice John Paul Stevens was a part of the Court’s majority opinion, which stated that the U.S. Constitution did not explicitly prohibit the school’s narrowly tailored use of race to promote a compelling interest in attaining the educational benefits that occur from having a diverse student population. The Supreme Court felt that the law school’s desire to achieve a critical mass of minority students did qualify as a tailored use. The majority opinion also suggested that in future cases, racial affirmative action should no longer be necessary and therefore no longer be allowed. This decision mostly upheld the position in the case University of California v. Bakke, where Justice Powell allowed race to be a factor in admissions policy, although quotas were illegal.

Texas v. Johnson (1989): A landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court which invalidated prohibitions regarding desecrating the American flag which was enforced in 48 of the 50 states. 

This case revolved around Gregory Lee Johnson, a former member of the Revolutionary Communist Youth Brigade, who participated in a political demonstration in Dallas, Texas during the Republican National Convention of 1984, which protested some policies of the Reagan Administration as well as some companies in Dallas. A demonstrator gave Johnson an American flag which was stolen from a targeted building. Once the protesters arrived at Dallas City Hall, Johnson drenched the flag with kerosene and set it on fire. While no one was injured, some claimed to be extremely offended. 

Johnson was charged with breaking the Texas law that prohibited the desecration of a venerated item. He was convicted, fined, and sentenced to a year in prison. The Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas saw the case through an appeal and overturned the conviction, saying that the State did not have the power to could not punish him for burning the flag since it was protected under the First Amendment as symbolic speech. However, the State of Texas claimed that its interests were more important than the symbolic speech rights because the state wished to preserve the national flag as a symbol of national unity while maintaining order, but the court stated that neither of these could justify the conviction. The State asked the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case. The opinion of the court was a controversial 5-4 decision, with Justice Thurgood Marshall being a part of the majority.

The Court first looked at whether the First Amendment could include non-speech acts and, if so, if flag burning was included. The court found that in this case, the flag burning constituted as expressive conduct, allowing Johnson the protecting under the First Amendment. The court also found that there was no disturbance of the peace due to the flag burning, and rejected the States claim that the flag burning was to incite breaches of the peace. The last issue was if the states had a legitimate interest in preserving the national flag as a symbol of principles and national identity. However, the majority found that the lack of evidence for Constitutional support regarding flag burning, so the Court concluded that it was protected under the first amendment. 

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a strongly dissenting opinion, which argued that the American flag was a symbol of freedom, of religious tolerance, of equal opportunity, and of good will for others who share the same aspirations and that value of the American flag as a symbol is not measurable. Justice John Paul Stevens concluded that the case at hand has nothing to do with having disagreeable ideas, but rather involved disagreeable conduct that which diminished the value of an important asset of the country and that Johnson was not punished for his opinion, but rather the way he expressed it.

United States v. Morrison (2000): is a decision made by the Supreme Court that stated that sections of the Violence Against Women Act (1994) were unconstitutional because the act passed by Congress exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause as well as under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This act that was originally passed contained a provision regarding federal civil remedies for gender-based violence victims, even in cases where no charged were filed.  The case revolved around an incident at Virginia Tech where a freshman student was allegedly assaulted and raped by members of the football team. One of the students admitted to having sexual contact with the student despite her protests. The college initially punished the student, but it was later struck down by the school administration. The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit Court’s decision to support the U.S. District Court’s opinion that Congress had exceeded their power under the Constitution. Justice John Paul Stevens was a part of the dissent opinion which argued that enacting the Violence Against Women Act was within the powers of Congress as allowed in the Commerce Clause. The dissent also stated that the majority opinion had looked over an old and discredited understanding of the Commerce Clause. Justice Breyer, who was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, also argued that it was mainly the responsibility of the United States Congress, and not the courts, to set limits on Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Breyer also stated that Congress had been very sensitive to issues of federalism when they enacted the Violence Against Women Act, and they had expressed doubts about the majority’s conclusions regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.

Bush v. Gore (2000): A landmark Supreme Court decision on December 12, 2000, that resolved the controversy of the 2000 presidential election in favor of G.W. Bush. Eight days before, the U.S> Supreme Court had decided unanimously the related case of Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (2000) and three days before that, had preliminarily stopped the recount that was happening in Florida. The Court ruled in a per curiam decision that the Florida Supreme Court’s technique for the ballot recount violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court also ruled that no other method could be made within the time limits that were created by Florida State. 

Four justices including Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and did not feel the recount should have been stopped. Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissent, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concluded that the petitioners’ federal assault on the election procedures in Florida had an underlying lack of confidence in the capacity and impartiality of the state judges that would make critical decisions if the count were to continue. 

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006): A Supreme Court case in which the Court held that military commissions that were set up by the Bush administration in order to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay lacked the power to process due to the fact that the procedures and structures violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice as well as the four Geneva Conventions which were signed in 1949.

The case looked at whether Congress could pass legislation to prevent the Supreme Court from taking the case of an accused combatant prior to his military commission takes place. The case also would determine if the special military commission that had been created violated federal law, and whether courts could enforce the 1949 Geneva Convention. The Court issued a 5-3 decision on June 29, 2006 which held that the court had jurisdiction and that President Bush did not have the proper authority to set up special military commissions without approval from Congress since they did not follow the Geneva Convention and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that the war crimes tribunals also violated the laws as well.

Justice John Paul Stevens was the author of the Supreme Court’s majority in part opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens began the opinion by looking at the issue of jurisdiction. Justice Stevens denied the United States ‘s motion to dismiss under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which gave the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals the exclusive jurisdiction to look over decisions of cases held in military commissions. However, the act did not have language that would suggest that the Supreme Court’s review would be excluded.  Because the military commission did not meet the necessary requirements of the Geneva Convention or the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the commission violated the laws of war thus could not be used to.

William Howard Taft was the 27th President of the United States and later the 10th Chief Justice of Supreme Court from 1921 to 1930. He is the only individual to have served in both of these positions, and one of only two presidents to have also headed a different branch of the federal government, excluding vice-presidents who later went on to become president.

William Howard Taft was born near Cincinnati on September 15, 1857. Taft went to Woodward High School in Cincinnati, and then continued on to attend Yale College in New Haven, Connecticut, where he  was a member of the Beta chapter of Psi Upsilon, Linonian Society, and Skull and Bones. William Howard Taft graduated second in his class in 1878 and continued his education at Cincinnati Law School, where he received a Bachelor of Laws in 1880. 

On June 30, 1921, President Warren G. Harding nominated William Howard Taft for the seat of Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The Senate approved Taft with a 60-4 vote in a secret session on the same day of the nomination, and Taft immediate received his commission. He took the oath of office on July 11, 1921, and served the court until retirement in 1930 due to his failing health. 

William Howard Taft decided to promote the introduction and passage of the 1925 Judiciary Act, which shifts the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to be mostly discretionary upon reviewing litigants’ petitioning , allowing the Supreme Court to preferentially receive cases that they believed were of national importance, allowing the Court to work in a more efficient manner.

Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922): A Supreme Court case where the court held that some provisions of the United States Constitution were not applicable to territories which were not incorporated into the union. This case began when Jesús M. Balzac was prosecuted for a criminal libel in Puerto Rico’s district court. He declared that his Constitutional rights had been violated under the Sixth Amendment since he was denied a trial by jury. He had not been given a trial by jury because the Puerto Rico’s code of criminal procedure did not allow for a jury trial for cases regarding misdemeanor. In the court appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgments made by the lower courts in Puerto Rico in deciding that the relevant Constitutional provisions did not apply to a territory that was not incorporated into the Union, while belonging to the United States.

The Supreme Court held a unanimous opinion which was delivered by Chief Justice William Howard Taft. Chief Justice Taft argued that while the Jones Act had granted citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico, the act had not actually incorporated Puerto Rico into the Union. Although the island had been under the United States control since after the 1898 Spanish-American War, the territory had never been designated for any sort of ultimate statehood. Chief Justice William Howard Taft distinguished Puerto Rico from the territory received in the Alaska purchase, which was acquired in 1867 from Russia, that in Rasmussen v. United States had been held to be incorporated. Thus, specific constitutional provisions were given based on location, instead of on citizenship.

Chief Justice William Howard Taft reason for denying jury trial was very similar to earlier reasoning in older Insular Cases. Chief Justice Taft argued that since Puerto Rico had been previously governed by Spanish civil law for four hundred, the inhabitants would not be prepared for jury service. Chief Justice Taft also argued that the locals should have the ability to determine their own laws. In the opinion, the court failed to resolve the exact fundamental personal rights  that would be extended to American citizens in Puerto Rico.

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922): A Supreme Court case in which the court ruled that the Child Labor Tax Law of 1919 was unconstitutional and an inappropriate attempt by the United States Congress to penalize employers who used child labor. The Supreme Court indicated that the tax law imposed by the statute was not really a tax but really a penalty in disguise.

Congress passed the Child Labor Tax Law on February 24, 1919, which created an excise tax of 10% on the net profits generated by a company that used children as employee. The tax law defined child labor as a worker under the age of 16 in a mine or quarry, and under the age of 14 in a cannery, mill, workshop, manufacturing, or factory establishment. The definition of child labor also included using children between the ages of 14 and 16 who worked over 8 hours a day or over 6 days a week, or worked between 7PM and 6AM.  Drexel Furniture Co. was a furniture manufacturing company based in North Carolina.

On September 21, 1921, a Bureau of Internal Revenue collector assessed $6,312.79 in excise taxes from the company for employing a child under the age of 14 during the 1919 tax year. The company paid the tax under protest, and then sued for a refund after.  The main argument used by Drexel was that the tax was an attempt to regulate manufacturing in an unconstitutional manner. The U.S. argued that the statute did not need to meet any standard if it was a geographically uniform indirect tax. Additionally, the United States said that the tax was only an excise tax levied by the United States Congress under the broad power of taxation found in Article One of the U.S. Constitution. The lower court ended up ruling in favor of the company.

Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s Court declared that the tax placed on child labor was unconstitutional since it was not actually a tax but rather it was a penalty on the employment of children. Additionally, the Child Labor Tax Law regulated businesses rather than acting as a tax. Chief Justice William Howard Taft argued the law described a specific course for businesses. Under the tax act, any deviation from that court resulted in a payment being enacted. 

Chief Justice William Howard Taft also said that the court had to commit itself ultimately to the law of the land, even if it required them to refuse a piece of legislation created to promote the highest good. Chief Justice Taft continued on by saying that good sought in legislation that is unconstitutional leads legislators and citizens down a risky path of compromising the constitution and its standards. Additionally, Congress could then take control of different areas of public interest that are normally controlled by the States under the Tenth Amendment. The Supreme Court later abandoned the philosophy found in the Bailey case.

Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923): A Supreme Court case where the opinion held that the federal minimum wage legislation for women was an unconstitutional violation of the liberty of contract, which is protected by the due process clause found in the Fifth Amendment. Congress passed a law setting the minimum wages for children and woman in 1918 in Washington, DC

As in other court cases, the issue of the case balancing the power Congress had to regulate safety and health with the right that individuals had to conduct their own business and affairs without having interference from Congress. Children’s Hospital along with female elevator operator from a hotel brought this court case to prevent enforcement of this minimum wage legislation by Jesse Adkins and the two wage board members.

The Supreme Court opinion held that previous court decisions such as Muller v. Oregon (1908) or Bunting v. Oregon (1917) did not overrule the decision made in Lochner v. New York (1905) which protected the freedom of contract.  The Supreme Court argued that if Congress was allowed to set laws regarding minimum wage, they would also be allowed to set wage laws regarding maximum wage. The majority opinion also discussed the changes that had occurred after Muller, particularly the passage of the 19th Amendment, which granted women the right to vote.

The opinion mentions any differences between men and women that justify special protection for women are no longer relevant in respect to the cultural changes that have occurred, particularly in the political, civil, and contractual, status of women, which have culminated in the 19th Amendment. Chief Justice William Howard Taft dissented and argued that there that there was no real different between maximum hour laws and minimum wage laws, considering that both of these effectively become restrictions on the employment contract. Chief Justice William. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital was ultimately overturned 1937 in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.

Carroll v. United States (1925): A Supreme Court decision that upheld that a search of an automobile without a warrant is the automobile exception. This court case has also been referred to in order to increase the scope of searches without warrants. In the case, federal prohibition officers set up an undercover purchase of liquor from an illicit dealer, George Carroll, who was under investigation, but the purchase transaction had not been completed. Later, the officers saw Carroll driving from Detroit to Grand Rapids on the highway, which they patrolled regularly. The officers gave chase, pulled the car over, and searched it, finding illegal liquor in the car.

The National Prohibition Act Stated that officers had the right to make searches of vehicles, airplanes, or boats without warrants when they had a reason to believe that illegal liquor was being transported. The Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Congress removed the need for a warrant in situations regarding border and that Congress always understood an important difference between searches of buildings versus vehicles for contraband items, where it is not as practical to acquire a warrant, since the vehicle can be moved quickly out of the jurisdiction or locality where the warrant must be acquired.

However, Chief Justice William Howard Taft and the Supreme Court held in a majority opinion that it would be unreasonable and intolerable if a prohibition agent had the authority to stop any vehicle on the chance of finding liquor, subjecting all individuals who are lawfully using the roads to the indignity and inconvenience of the search. The Supreme Court also added that when the securing of a warrant is done reasonably, it must be done.

This precedent became known as the Carroll doctrine, meaning a warrant was necessary to search a vehicle if there was some probable cause to think that evidence was present, coupled with pressing circumstances to think that the vehicle could be removed from the area acquiring a warrant.

Myers v. United States (1926): A United States Supreme Court decision which ruled that the President of the United States can remove executive branch officials with his exclusive powers, and is not required to obtain the approval of the Senate or another legislative body.

Frank Myers, a First-Class Postmaster in Portland, Oregon, was removed from his office by President Wilson in 1920. A federal law created in 1876 stated that first, second, and third class Postmasters could be appointed and removed by the President of the United States with the consent and advice of the U.S. Senate. Frank Myers argued that his dismissal was in violation of this law, and that he was entitled to receive back pay for the portion of the four-year term that was unfilled.

Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote the opinion for the Court, where he noted that the appointment of officials was mentioned in the Constitution, but there was nothing regarding the dismissal officials. A look at the notes of the Constitutional Convention, showed that this was intentional and that it was implicit in the Constitution that only the President held the exclusive power to remove his own staff, which existed as extensions of the President’s authority.

The Supreme Court therefore held that the law was unconstitutional, and it violated the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches. This decision also found that Tenure of Office Act, which had placed a similar requirement on previous Presidential appointees and was critical in President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment, had also been invalid.